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Abstract
This article explores audience perceptions of different types of disinformation, and the actions that users take to combat
them, in three Spanish-speaking countries: Argentina, Chile, and Spain. Quantitative data from the Digital News Report
(2018 and 2019), based on a survey of more than 2000 digital users from each country was used for the analysis. Results
show remarkable similarities among the three countries, and how digital users identically ranked the types of problem-
atic information that concerned them most. Survey participants were most concerned by stories where facts are spun
or twisted to push a particular agenda, followed by, those that are completely made up for political or commercial rea-
sons, and finally, they were least concerned by poor journalism (factual mistakes, dumbed-down stories, misleading head-
lines/clickbait). A general index of “Concern about disinformation” was constructed using several sociodemographic vari-
ables that might influence the perception. It showed that the phenomenon is higher among women, older users, those
particularly interested in political news, and among left-wingers. Several measures are employed by users to avoid disinfor-
mation, such as checking a number of different sources to see whether a news story is reported in the same way, relying
on the reputation of the news company, and/or deciding not to share a news story due to doubts regarding its accuracy.
This article concludes that the perceived relevance of different types of problematic information, and preventive actions,
are not homogeneous among different population segments.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, academics and the media have been
paying attention to the phenomenon of disinformation
(Freelon &Wells, 2020; McKay & Tenove, 2020). The fact
that disinformation poses a threat to democratic insti-
tutions has contributed to mounting concern regarding
this problem (Miller & Vaccari, 2020). Disinformation
is a modality within a broader field called ‘problem-
atic information’ (Jack, 2017), which includes various
types of information that are considered inaccurate, mis-
leading, or found to be improperly or totally manufac-
tured. Although it is true that this type of media is not
novel, today’s information ecosystem is without prece-
dent, due to its sheer scale and scope. This fosters new
ways in which problematic information can be created,
circulated, and received by users, increasing its potential
effects (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). Said infor-
mation ecosystem is technological in nature, but it also
has political, social, and economic implications, giving
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rise to what Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) have called
an ‘information disorder.’
2. Theoretical Framework
The academic literature on disinformation has grown
remarkably in the last decade (Ha, Perez, & Ray, 2019).
Following Freelon and Wells (2020), two main areas of
enquiry are particularly worth noting: On the one hand,
research that focuses on content, and on the other,
reception studies. In the following pages we analyze
these areas in detail.
2.1. Types of ‘Problematic Information’
Regarding content, various types of information are
included under the paradigm of ‘problematic informa-
tion.’ Among them, the term ‘fake news’ has become the
most popular. However, Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019)
caution that the term fake news should not be used to
group instances of falsehood indiscriminately. As the con-
cept should differentiate between fake news as a genre
and the fake news label as applied to specific news by
political figures to discredit journalism (Khaldarova &
Pantti, 2016). For this reason, it is preferable to broaden
the range of concepts included in this phenomenon.
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) pointed out six different
types of problematic information:
1) Unintentional reporting mistakes; 2) rumours that
do not originate from a particular news article; 3) con-
spiracy theories (these are, by definition, difficult to
verify as true or false, and they typically originate
from those who believe them to be true); 4) satire
that is unlikely to be misconstrued as factual; 5) false
statements by politicians; and 6) reports that are
slanted or misleading but not outright false. (p. 214)
In addition, Tandoc, Lim, and Ling (2018), through a
bibliographic review of the academic literature, iden-
tify six types, partially coinciding with the above—
news satire, news parody, fabrication, manipulation, pro-
paganda, and advertising—which they organize along
two dimensions according to their level of facticity
and deception.
According to the High Level Expert Group on Fake
News and Disinformation, designated by the European
Commission, disinformation includes “all forms of false,
inaccurate, or misleading information designed, pre-
sented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm
or for profit” (High Level Expert Group on Fake News and
Disinformation, 2018, p. 5). This definition introduces
a parameter that helps catalogue the cast of disinfor-
mation genres, namely the content creator’s motivation.
Indeed, the intention to cause harm or to seek profit is
a vector that allows malicious disinformation and delib-
erately polarized content to be distinguished from other
situations where online content may be untruthful, such
as satirical news or journalistic pieces that turn out to
be imprecise due to lack of professionalism. Although
such pieces do not intend to cause deception or confu-
sion, this may in fact, be the result. The content itself, its
factuality, the lexical and syntactic features within it, and
any evidence presentedmight inadvertently cause confu-
sion. The sources that are consulted for these journalistic
pieces, the possible intentions of the issuing agent, and
other structural elements (such as URL, or website trans-
parency), allow for the establishment of a taxonomy of
modalities of false content that contrast with the ‘real
news.’ These range from fabricated news to disguised
advertising, including also parodic news or information
from hyperpartisan sources (Molina, Sundar, Le, & Lee,
2019). Therefore, we ask:
RQ1: What are the types of disinformation that raise
more concern among digital users?
2.2. Factors that Influence Disinformation Reception
Firstly, and from a macro point of view, researchers have
centred on which structural conditions of countries can
lead to a greater or lesser resilience towards disinforma-
tion. Following Humprecht, Esser, and Van Aelst (2020),
carried out cross-national comparative research in 18
countries, these factors include the country’s level of
social polarization, political populism, trust in the news,
or the strength of the public media, among others.
Descending to the individual level, a review of the
literature suggests that exposure and vulnerability to
disinformation are mediated by several different fac-
tors: political ideology, age, gender, and level of interest
in public affairs. Regarding ideological self-positioning,
some studies agreed that the American right-wing is sub-
stantially more vulnerable to disinformation attacks, and
more likely to accept them, than the left-wing. It is an
‘ideological asymmetry’ (Freelon et al., 2020), showed
in two different dimensions: First, the content dimen-
sion, wherein disinformation providers produce vastly
more conservative-oriented messages than liberal ones
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Howard, Ganesh, Liotsiou,
Kelly, & Francois, 2018; Mckay & Tenove, 2020); second,
the reception dimension, showing that conservatives are
also more likely to engage with the disinformation mes-
sages that target them than liberals (Grinberg, Joseph,
Friedland, Swire-Thompson, & Lazer, 2019; Hjorth &
Adler-Nissen, 2019).
Regarding age as a significant variable in relation
to disinformation reception, Guess, Nagler, and Tucker
(2019) identify a strong age effect, through their research
on individual-level characteristics associated with shar-
ing false articles during the 2016 US presidential cam-
paign. Respondents in an older age category were
more likely to share fake news than respondents in
the next-youngest group. Overall, users over 65 years
old, shared nearly seven times as many articles from
fake news domains as the youngest age group. Other
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studies, such as that of Serrano-Puche, Fernández, and
Rodríguez-Virgili (2021), using the Venezuelan political
landscape as a case study, have analysed vulnerability
to disinformation as dependent, besides age, on edu-
cational level and the main source of information (ana-
logue or digital).
The relationship between gender and attitudes
towards disinformation has been understudied and lacks
conclusive results. Studies such as Reuter, Hartwig,
Kirchner, and Schlegel (2019) have found significant dif-
ferences in Germany among men and women regarding
perceptions of disinformation’s effects on society and
the agents that cause it. However, gendered differences
were not found among ways to react to disinformation.
In a similar vein, in a survey with Portuguese college stu-
dents, Morais and Cruz (2020) found gender differences
in the use of media and information consumption, but
not in the skills to distinguish between credible and false
sources of information.
Regarding interest in political matters, research indi-
cates that using social media for news can lead to
the spread of misinformation, albeit indirectly, due to
its association with individuals’ political participation
(Valenzuela, Halpern, Katz, & Miranda, 2019). Although
being politically engaged does not make people more
or less likely to be misinformed, active users are more
likely to share inaccurate contents than those who are
less politically engaged (Bail et al., 2020). Other studies
indicate that political participation can promote the for-
mation of closed groups in which disinformation is more
likely to be sent and received. In this way, with the con-
solidation of such polarized groups, the opportunity to
access divergent information diminishes, favouring selec-
tive exposure to partisan sources (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009;
Lazer et al., 2018). As with selective exposure, moti-
vated reasoning can contribute to an individual becom-
ingmisinformed (Scheufele & Krause, 2019).When users
engage in goal-directed processing of new information to
protect preexisting values, beliefs, and ideologies (Kunda,
1990), and when such directional goals influence rea-
soning processes, individuals become prone to ‘biased
assimilation’ (Lord & Taylor, 2009). This is the tendency
to privilege information that is consistent with one’s pre-
dispositions, discrediting information that seems con-
tradictory. Giglietto, Iannelli, Valeriani, and Rossi (2019)
affirm that those who receive disinformation can in turn
become its propagators—whether intentionally or not.
This might generate propagation cascades where the
intention of the ‘injector’ does not determine the future
evolution of the false information cycle, meaning that
what was born as a parody or a journalistic error can end
up being amplified for manipulative purposes.
Taking all this into consideration, we also ask:
RQ2: Do sociodemographic factors, such as political
leaning, age, gender, and interest in political news,
influence the perception of disinformation?
2.3. Coping with Disinformation: The Role of
Media Literacy
The phenomenon of disinformation requires a reconcep-
tualization affecting news media practices, media poli-
cies, and howmedia literacy initiatives are designed and
mappedout. In this sense, it is necessary to situatemedia
literacy within an ample framework of actions, centring
in the defence of the public sphere and common inter-
ests. According to Lazer et al. (2018), there are two cate-
gories of interventions thatmight be effective to stop the
flow and influence of disinformation: “(i) those aimed
at empowering individuals to evaluate the fake news
they encounter, and (ii) structural changes aimed at pre-
venting exposure of individuals to fake news in the first
instance” (p. 1095).
Regarding the first category, there is an academic
consensus that citizens are largely uninformed due to
their inability to critically examine and evaluate infor-
mation (Scheufele & Krause, 2019). Although it may
also be due to the aforementioned reasons for cogni-
tive biases, there is no doubt that a part of the disinfor-
mation problem is citizens’ low level of media literacy.
Starting from the basic definition that media literacy
is “the ability of a citizen to access, analyze, and pro-
duce information for specific outcomes” (Aufderheide,
1993, p. 6), it can be concluded that it is the evalua-
tion skill that poses the most relevant challenge for dis-
information, as those with limited ability to evaluate
“cannot distinguish dated, biased or exploitative sources”
(Livingstone, 2004, p. 6). Therefore, as Klurfeld and
Schneider (2014) point out, “the ultimate check against
the spread of rumour, pernicious falsehood, disinforma-
tion, and unverified reports masquerading as fact” is a
“generation of astutely educated news consumers” who
can “identify for themselves fact-and-evidence-based
news and information’’ (p. 19).
In regards to the actions taken by citizens to com-
bat disinformation, a review of the literature allows us to
identify some recurring measures. In a qualitative study
with 71 American users from different cities, Wagner
and Boczkowski (2019) identify as main measures: draw-
ing upon the experience and knowledge to assess news
quality, triangulating sources, fact-checking, seeking for
repetition of information across outlets, consumption of
cross-ideological sources, and relying on certain personal
contacts on social media who are perceived as good
assessors of news quality. For their part, Tandoc, Ling,
Westlund, Duffy, Goh, and Zheng (2018) utilize a survey
of 2,501 Singaporeans to propose a conceptual frame-
work to understand how individuals authenticate the
information they encounter on social media. The results
suggest that users rely on their own judgment of both
the source and themessage, andwhen this does not ade-
quately provide a definitive answer, they turn to exter-
nal resources to authenticate news items (from their
social sphere or other institutional sources). On the other
hand, fact-checking can be incidental and can simply
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arise from the process of interacting with friends or con-
suming media.
The option of consulting a fact-checking website
is not frequent among Portuguese university students,
according to Figueira and Santos (2019). When in doubt
about the veracity of a news item, the young people
surveyed were more likely to check various sources, in
addition to consulting trustworthy organizations. Finally,
in a survey among Germans on ‘fake news’ perceptions,
Reuter et al. (2019) indicate that even though about half
of the respondents (48%) had noticed fake news, most
participants report never having liked, shared, or com-
mented on it.
Since user response is important in the spread and
control of fake news on social media, finally we ask
the following:
RQ3: What are the most common actions taken




This work is part of a line of research by the authors that
seeks to broaden the understanding of digital information
consumption. Most empirical studies to date have a nar-
row geographical perspective, which limits the universal-
ity of inquiry in those topics, and suffer from a lack of con-
textualization (Rojas & Valenzuela, 2019). Thus, the geo-
graphical focus of our inquiry is centred in Iberoamerica,
which encompasses Latin America and Spain (Fernández
& Rodríguez-Virgili, 2019; Serrano-Puche et al., 2021;
Serrano-Puche, Fernández, & Rodríguez-Virgili, 2018).
A region where the academic literature on disinforma-
tion has grown in recent years (Guallar, Codina, Freixa,
& Pérez-Montoro, 2020), but which still lacks empirical
studies. Our analysis focuses on three Spanish speaking
democracieswith high Internet penetration rates, ranging
from 77.5% of the population in Chile to 92.5% and 93.1%
in Spain and Argentina, according to data from Internet
World Stats (2019; Table 1).
Considering our objective to develop the under-
standing of disinformation in Iberoamerica, one thing
to note is that countries such as Argentina, Chile, and
Spain are experiencing symptoms of information dis-
order as do the other countries of the global North
(Valenzuela et. al., 2019; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).
The Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman,
Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2019) shows a gen-
eralized and steady decline in the average level of trust
in the news and in traditional media worldwide. In addi-
tion, these three countries have experienced recent elec-
toral or post-electoral contexts: Chile held presidential
elections in 2017, Argentina in 2019, and Spain held two
general elections in 2019. Objectives will be addressed
in this comparative study using a most-similar systems
approach (Meckstroth, 1975).
3.2. Sample
This work was developed from surveys carried out
annually by the Reuters Institute Digital News Report
(Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen,
2018; Newman et. al., 2019), an international study
on the consumption of digital information coordinated
since 2012 by the University of Oxford, which cur-
rently includes 40 countries. For this specific study, sur-
veys from the years 2018 and 2019 were consulted.
Specifically, this study analysed user samples from
Argentina (2018: n= 2,012; 2019: n= 2,006), Chile (2018:
n = 2,008; 2019: n = 2,004), and Spain (2018: n = 2,023;
2019: n = 2,005).
The participants of the Digital News Report are
adult Internet users who have consumed news in the
last month, which serve as representatives of the con-
nected population according to sociodemographic and
geographic criteria. The data has been weighted accord-
ing to official censuses and data accepted by the indus-
try, and classified by age, sex, region, newspaper reading,
and educational level, in order to better reflect the pop-
ulation of the three countries analysed. However, one
should bear in mind that although these samples repre-
sent the digital population well, they do not necessarily
represent the general population, and this can be consid-
ered a methodological limitation of the research.
3.3. Questionnaire and Variables
The online questionnaires cover a wide range of
questions about news consumption, from which this
research selected those that relate to disinformation.
Questionnaires were not identical for both years. First,
we used a question related to the different types of prob-
lematic information, from the 2018 survey:
Table 1. Penetration of the Internet in analysed countries.
Country Population Internet Users Penetration Rate
Argentina 44,688,864 41,586,960 93.1%
Chile 18,197,209 14,108,392 77.5%
Spain 46,441,049 42,961,230 92.5%
Source: Internet World Stats (2019).
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To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about
the following:
• Stories where facts are spun or twisted to push a
particular agenda
• Stories that are completelymade up for political or
commercial reasons
• Poor journalism (factual mistakes, dumbed-down
stories, misleading headlines/clickbait)
• The use of the term fake news (e.g., by politicians,
others) to discredit news media they don’t like
• Headlines that look like news stories but turn out
to be advertisements
• Stories that are completely made up to make peo-
ple laugh (satire)
From the 2019 survey we used a question about the
different actions that users can take to protect against
disinformation:
Have youdone anyof the following in the last year?
Please select all that apply.
• I checked a number of different sources to see
whether a news story was reported in the same
way
• I decided not to share a news story because I was
unsure about its accuracy
• I discussed a news story with a person I trust
because I was unsure about its accuracy
• I stopped paying attention to news shared by
someone because I am unsure whether I trust that
person
• I stopped using certain news sources because I was
unsure about the accuracy of their reporting
• I started relying more on sources of news that are
considered more reputable
Considering our review of the literature and following
the aforementioned research questions, the analysis of
the answers takes into account sociodemographic vari-
ables such as age, gender, political leaning, access to, and
interest in news.
3.4. Procedure
The fieldwork was carried out between the end of
January and the beginning of February of both years,
2018 and 2019. It was conducted by the firm YouGov,
which sent an invitation via email for users to complete
an online poll.
3.5. Analyses
First, within each country, we identified what the par-
ticipants’ most prevalent concerns were regarding disin-
formation. Differences were testedwithMcNemar’s test,
after which Chi-squared tests were performed to identify
differences according to country, gender, and political
self-positioning. The association between the concerns
and age was tested with Spearman correlations. Finally,
we created a composite measure of ‘Concern about
disinformation’ based on the answers to the 6 items.
Amultivariate linear regressionwas then performedwith
this composite measure as a dependent variable, and
different independent variables such as demographics
and others related to news and politics. We performed
the same analyses for the variables regarding actions
against disinformation.
4. Results
In response to the aforementioned research objectives
and questions, results are presented below under two
main headings. First, we analyse which types of prob-
lematic information are of most concern for digital users
in Argentina, Chile, and Spain (RQ1). The most common
measures adopted by these users to combat disinforma-
tion (RQ3) are presented below. In both cases, and from
a comparative perspective, the incidence of sociodemo-
graphic factors (RQ2) on the phenomenon of disinforma-
tion is examined.
4.1. Concerns about Disinformation
According to the Digital News Report of 2018, in general,
the phenomenon of disinformation is a major concern
among digital users in Argentina (60%), Chile (66%) and,
to a greater extent, in Spain (69%), but the differentman-
ifestations of disinformation do not worry users to the
same degree (Newman et. al., 2018). The questionnaire
probes a range of six types of problematic information
to which the interviewee assigns a greater or lesser level
of concern. It should be noted that for the three coun-
tries, the final user ranking of problematic information
is very similar (Table 2). The most worrying type of prob-
lematic information within the three countries analysed
is “news that are created or altered in favor of a par-
ticular agenda” (77% of Spaniards, 74% of Argentinians,
and 69% of Chileans). In the second spot, citizens placed
“news that are completely invented,with political or com-
mercial motivations” (in both Argentina and Spain, 73%
of surveyed were concerned, with slightly lower num-
bers in Chile). In third place, participants selected errors
that could be explained by mediocre journalism, such as
inaccuracies, wrong or striking headlines that only seek
to generate clicks (with 68% of the participants from
these three countries showing concern). Likewise, for the
three countries surveyed, the existence of parody news,
or those just invented to make people laugh, occupy the
last place in the ranking of concerns among those survey
participants (with only 29–32% of participants showing
concern for this type of media). News stories that can
be considered as covert advertising, straying far from the
news, are not reported to be of much concern either.
There does not seem to be a distinctive pattern
related to concerns about problematic information
when considering the gender of the interviewees (see
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Table 2. Concern about disinformation by country.
Argentina Chile Spain
(N = 2012) (N = 2008) (N = 2023) p *
Stories where facts are spun or twisted to push a 74% a 69% a 77% a < .001
particular agenda
Stories that are completely made up for political or 73% a 68% a 73% b < .001
commercial reasons
Poor journalism (factual mistakes, dumbed-down stories, 68% b 68% a 68% c .745
misleading headlines/clickbait)
The use of the term fake news (e.g., by politicians, others) 58% b 66% d 60% c < .001
to discredit news media they don’t like
Headlines that look like news stories but turn out to 43% d 43% c 53% e < .001
be advertisements
Stories that are completely made up to make people 29% e 33% d 34% f .001
laugh (satire)
Notes: Question “To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following” (answers: Very + Extremely concerned). Within each
country, different superscripts indicate a statistically significant (p < .05) difference in percentages, according to the McNemar’s test
(a > b > c > d > e > f). * p-value of the Chi-squared test for the inter-country comparison. Source: Adapted from the Reuters Institute
Digital News Report survey 2018, conducted by YouGov.
Supplementary File, Table A). Instead, when analysing
responses to concern about types of disinformation by
age group, as shown in Table 3, findings suggest a pat-
tern: in all cases, concern over disinformation increased
with age.
When we analyse the concern regarding disinfor-
mation according to the reported ideological position
(Table 4), as measured by the political self-positioning of
the interviewees, we find an interesting pattern in the
three countries analysed: those who see themselves as
‘left-leaning’ tend to worry more about disinformation.
This pattern is evident in the three countries analysed
and when analysing the forms of disinformation that
were considered most worrying.
4.2. Actions against Disinformation
There is a similar pattern in the three countries analysed
in relation to the actions they take to protect themselves
against disinformation (Table 5). The checking of differ-
ent sources and how they contrast with each other is
the main measure that Argentinian (60%), Chilean (63%),
and Spanish (56%) respondents take against disinforma-
tion. In second place, participants attempt to avoid viral-
izing news that is not entirely reliable (52%, 50%, and
40%, respectively).
However, although the relative importance attached
to the different measures of disinformation is the same,
the intensity of the reaction is not equal. There is
an important gender gap in the actions taken when
faced with problematic information (Supplementary File,
Table B).
Although a clear pattern was detected in the three
countries (Table 3) regarding the direct relationship
between age and concern about ‘problematic informa-
tion,’ the same does not occur with reported actions to
combat disinformation (Table 6). Only in a few cases do
we find a significant linear trend. A clear trend was found
in Spain, where younger participants reported more fre-
quently discussing newswith a person they trust. Another
clear trend was found in Chile, where older participants
reported a higher incidence of checking different sources
and of stopping paying attention to news shared by some-
one because of being unsure of that person’s reliability.
Regarding the relationship between ideological self-
positioning and the differentmeasures to protect against
disinformation, divergences are observed (Table 7).
In Argentina and Chile, those who declare themselves as
being on the left of the political spectrum stop consult-
ing some media when they feel the medium has failed
them (49% and 47%, respectively) more often than cen-
trists (39% and 38%) and right-wingers (37% and 38%).
Moreover, in Argentina, left-wingers discussed newswith
a person they trust (44%)more often than centrists (41%)
and right-wingers (32%).
4.3. Predicting Concern and Actions
The composite measure of ‘Concern about disinforma-
tion’ showed a good internal consistency (Cronbach
alpha = .84). In the multiple regression to predict this
measure (see Table 8), concern about disinformationwas
higher amongwomen, older participants, thosewith high
interest in political news, left-wingers, and Spaniards.
Regarding actions against disinformation, the inter-
nal consistency of the composite measure was lower
(Cronbach alpha = .56), probably due to the fact that
these variables were dichotomous. According to the
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Table 3. Concern about disinformation by age.
Argentina Chile Spain
18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ p * 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ p * 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ p *
(N = 300) (N = 418) (N = 398) (N = 302) (N = 594) (N = 281) (N = 416) (N = 357) (N = 361) (N = 592) (N = 166) (N = 293) (N = 413) (N = 399) (N = 753)
Stories where
facts are spun or
twisted to push a
particular agenda
66% 68% 71% 76% 82% < .001 61% 58% 65% 70% 82% < .001 74% 68% 72% 79% 83% < .001
Stories that are
completely made
up for political or
commercial
reasons







60% 64% 66% 68% 76% < .001 63% 62% 65% 68% 78% < .001 62% 60% 62% 72% 75% < .001




















31% 25% 26% 28% 34% .046 29% 29% 30% 30% 41% < .001 31% 30% 33% 34% 36% .033
Notes: Question “To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following” (answers: Very + Extremely concerned). * p-value of the Spearman correlation between each type of concern and age
(within each country). Source: Adapted from the Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey 2018, conducted by YouGov.
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Table 4. Concern about disinformation due to political position.
Argentina Chile Spain
Left Centre Right p * Left Centre Right p * Left Centre Right p *
(N = 204) (N = 1138) (N = 201) (N = 313) (N = 934) (N = 285) (N = 585) (N = 1108) (N = 143)
Stories where facts
are spun or twisted
to push a particular
agenda











73% 72% 70% .634 75% 74% 70% .277 70% 68% 71% .569
The use of the term
fake news (e.g., by
politicians, others)
to discredit news
media they don’t like
63% 62% 60% .687 67% 64% 53% < .001 72% 65% 64% .009
Headlines that look
like news stories but
turn out to be
advertisements





30% 28% 30% .506 31% 34% 35% .711 32% 35% 42% .075
Notes: Question “To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following” (answers: Very + Extremely concerned). * p-value of the Chi-squared test. Source: Adapted from the Reuters Institute
Digital News Report survey 2018, conducted by YouGov.
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Table 5. Actions against disinformation by country.
Argentina Chile Spain p *
(N = 2006) (N = 2004) (N = 2005)
I checked a number of different sources to see whether 60% a 63% a 56% a < .001
a news story was reported in the same way
I decided not to share a news story because I was 52% b 50% b 40% b < .001
unsure about its accuracy
I discussed a news story with a person I trust because 37% d 40% c 37% b .090
I was unsure about its accuracy
I stopped paying attention to news shared by someone 39% c 40% c 28% c < .001
because I am unsure whether I trust that person
I stopped using certain news sources because I was 35% d 36% d 29% c < .001
unsure about the accuracy of their reporting
I started relying more on sources of news that are 27% e 27% e 20% d < .001
considered more reputable
Notes: Question “Have you done any of the following in the last year? Please select all that apply.” Within each country, different super-
scripts indicate a statistically significant (p< .05) difference in percentages, according to theMcNemar’s test (a > b > c > d > e). * p-value
of the Chi-squared test. for the inter-country comparison. Source: Adapted from the Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey 2019,
conducted by YouGov.
regression, a greater number of actions were carried out
by participants with post-secondary education, by those
who access news more frequently, by those who have
greater interest in political news, and by Argentinians
and Chileans.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In the previous sections, we comparatively analysed the
perceptions of disinformation by digital users in three
Spanish-speaking countries.
After analysing the data, and in response to the first
research question (RQ1), Internet users from Argentina,
Chile, and Spain agree both on the types of problematic
information that they consider to be ofmost concern and
on their ranking, considering the use of news to push par-
ticular agendas as the most worrying. These are closely
followed by stories that are completely made up for
political or commercial reasons, and thirdly, by instances
of poor journalism such as factual mistakes and mis-
leading headlines. Regardless, people see the difference
between fake news and news as one of degree rather
than a clear distinction, following research by Nielsen
and Graves (2017) who conducted focus groups on dif-
ferent countries combined with Reuters Digital News
Reports. Thus, from an audience perspective, these
modalities of problematic information seem to be part
of a broader discontent with the news industry, as well
as platform companies and politicians.
Given these remarkable similarities in general per-
ceptions of problematic information, the differences
found among the analysed sociodemographic segments
are even more relevant (RQ2). A general index of
‘Concern about disinformation’ showed that it is higher
among women, older people, those with high interest in
political news, left-wingers, and Spaniards.
In response to RQ3, participants in the three coun-
tries also react similarly regarding the actions taken to
protect themselves against disinformation. They indi-
cate the same order of measures to combat this phe-
nomenon, and with similar frequency in Argentina, Chile,
and Spain—although to a lesser extent in Spain. The
checking of different sources is the main measure that
respondents from the three countries take against dis-
information, followed by avoiding viralizing news that
is not entirely reliable and discussing news stories with
interpersonal contacts when its accuracy is unclear. The
importance given to fact-checking partially matches pre-
vious research (Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019). It works as
an ‘external act of authentication’ (Tandoc, Ling, et al.,
2018) complementing other measures such as the con-
sulting of trusted peers. It is also important to note that
surveyees gave importance to not being a propagator of
fake news. Even if this is due to a possible social desirabil-
ity bias, it is relevant as this constitutes one of the basic
actions of media literacy against disinformation.
Considering how the variables of age, gender, and
political position influence perceptions and actions to
combat disinformation (RQ2), we pointed out that the
concern about disinformation increases as the partic-
ipants age. This is a finding that concurs with other
research (Guess et al., 2019). As might be expected,
those who are more interested in political news are
also more concerned about disinformation (Chadwick &
Vaccari, 2019). Regarding gender, there are few differ-
ences (as can be seen in more detail in Supplementary
File, Tables A and B). Men and women share similar con-
cerns about disinformation and ranked them in the same
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Table 6. Actions against disinformation by age.
Argentina Chile Spain
18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ p * 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ p * 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55+ p*
(N = 297) (N = 413) (N = 397) (N = 305) (N = 594) (N = 271) (N = 413) (N = 357) (N = 355) (N = 609) (N = 164) (N = 283) (N = 399) (N = 399) (N = 760)
I checked a number
of different sources




57% 59% 61% 64% 60% .337 58% 60% 60% 67% 68% < .001 55% 52% 56% 57% 57% 1.83
I decided not to




49% 52% 54% 51% 54% .282 51% 53% 47% 49% 49% .310 37% 36% 45% 40% 39% .923
I discussed a news
story with a person
I trust because
I was unsure about
its accuracy






I trust that person




I was unsure about
the accuracy of
their reporting
36% 37% 33% 35% 35% .737 33% 35% 34% 36% 38% .145 26% 30% 27% 29% 30% .407
I started relying




26% 26% 24% 22% 31% .073 31% 24% 25% 23% 30% .270 20% 24% 19% 18% 19% .481
Notes: Question “Have you done any of the following in the last year? Please select all that apply.” * p-value of the Spearman correlation between each type of action and age (within each country). Source:
Adapted from the Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey 2019, conducted by YouGov.
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Table 7. Actions against disinformation by political position.
Argentina Chile Spain
Left Centre Right p* Left Centre Right p* Left Centre Right p*
(N = 179) (N = 897) (N = 177) (N = 267) (N = 787) (N = 248) (N = 547) (N = 867) (N = 218)
I checked a number of
different sources to see
whether a news story
was reported in the
same way
68% 66% 62% .641 72% 70% 63% .118 58% 58% 55% .461
I decided not to share a
news story because I was
unsure about its
accuracy
56% 58% 53% .558 54% 55% 55% .965 41% 43% 37% .364
I discussed a news story
with a person I trust
because I was unsure
about its accuracy
44% 41% 32% .025 44% 42% 43% .920 38% 39% 36% .781
I stopped paying
attention to news shared
by someone because
I am unsure whether
I trust that person
43% 44% 37% .203 49% 44% 44% .276 29% 30% 29% .859
I stopped using certain
news sources because
I was unsure about the
accuracy of their
reporting
49% 39% 37% 0.14 47% 38% 38% .035 33% 30% 34% .226
I started relying more on
sources of news that are
considered more
reputable
30% 30% 38% .083 25% 32% 33% .064 18% 22% 22% .098
Notes: Question “Have you done any of the following in the last year? Please select all that apply.” * p-value of the Chi-squared test. Source: Adapted from the Reuters Institute Digital News Report survey
2019, conducted by YouGov.
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Table 8. Predictors associated with concern about misinformation and with actions against disinformation.
Concern about misinformation a Actions against disinformation b
N Mean (SD) p c B (95% CI) d N Mean (SD) p c B (95% CI) d
Gender
Male 2362 21.88 (4.98) .004 (ref) 2160 2.58 (1.63) .745 (ref)
Female 2250 22.30 (4.83) 0.59 (0.31 to 0.87) 2052 2.60 (1.53) 0.03 (−0.06 to 0.13)
Age
18–44 2191 21.44 (4.84) < .001 (ref) 1978 2.59 (1.54) .956 (ref)
45+ 2421 22.67 (4.89) 1.00 (0.72 to 1.28) 2234 2.59 (1.62) 0.00 (−0.09 to 0.10)
Post-secondary education
No 1358 22.00 (5.08) .436 (ref) 2387 2.50 (1.59) < .001 (ref)
Yes 3254 22.12 (4.84) −0.05 (−0.35 to 0.26) 1825 2.70 (1.56) 0.17 (0.08 to 0.27)
Access to news
Once per day or less 1699 21.71 (5.03) < .001 (ref) 1580 2.28 (1.55) < .001 (ref)
More than once per day 2913 22.31 (4.82) 0.27 (−0.03 to 0.56) 2632 2.77 (1.57) 0.38 (0.29 to 0.48)
Interest in political news
Little 1885 20.93 (5.21) < .001 (ref) 2187 2.40 (1.55) < .001 (ref)
Much 2727 22.88 (4.52) 1.75 (1.45 to 2.05) 2025 2.79 (1.60) 0.34 (0.24 to 0.44)
Political self-position
Left 1032 22.54 (4.90) < .001 (ref) 984 2.53 (1.58) .241 (ref)
Centre 2992 22.05 (4.80) −0.27 (−0.61 to 0.08) 2589 2.62 (1.57) −0.01 (−0.12 to 0.11)
Right 588 21.47 (5.40) −0.61 (−1.10 to −0.11) 639 2.54 (1.64) −0.11 (−0.26 to 0.04)
Country
Argentina 1447 21.92 (4.88) < .001 (ref) 1259 2.79 (1.57) < .001 (ref)
Chile 1387 21.61 (5.41) −0.03 (−0.39 to 0.33) 1297 2.83 (1.62) 0.07 (−0.05 to 0.19)
Spain 1778 22.60 (4.46) 0.44 (0.10 to 0.78) 1656 2.24 (1.50) −0.57 (−0.68 to −0.45)
Notes: a Index (range 6–30) obtained from the sum of 6 questions regarding the extent to which participants were concerned about different types of disinformation. b Index (range 0–6) obtained from the
sum of 6 questions regarding whether participants had done any of different actions against disinformation. c p-value for the Student’s t-test in dichotomous variables (‘Age’ through ‘Interest in political
news’) or for the ANOVA in trichotomous variables (‘Political self-position’ and ‘Country’). d B coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals) of the multiple linear regression of each variable, adjusted for all
variables in the first column. Adjusted R-squared = .06 (for the model predicting ‘Concern about misinformation’) and .07 (for the model predicting ‘Actions against disinformation’).
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order of importance. This also seems to agree with previ-
ous studies (Wolverton & Stevens, 2019), which found
no significant differences in this regard. However, and
despite this relative uniformity, there are different reac-
tions against disinformation. Men and women reported
taking different measures to protect themselves from
misinformation, although they are concerned about the
same elements. While men rely more on the reputation
of the source as a preventive action, women appear to
be more active in taking steps to protect themselves
against fake news, checking different sources to com-
pare, and/or avoiding sharing a news story if they are not
sure of its adequacy. In other words, men and women
agree more in the diagnosis of the problem, than in the
path followed to solve it. Following Giglietto et al. (2019),
it could be said that when women receive disinforma-
tion, they avoid becoming propagators of it to a greater
degree than men.
Finally, regarding ideological self-positioning as a vari-
able for interpreting the phenomenon, we see that those
who define themselves as ‘right-wing’ or ‘centre’ tend to
worry slightly less about the problems of disinformation
than those that claim to be ‘left-wing.’ This was clearly
observed in the Argentinian and Chilean cases. This is
not a finding against what previous research has found
regarding US voters, as one might think on first impulse:
Those studies that analysed the 2016 US presidential
election and found that American right-wing voters were
more vulnerable to disinformation than the left-wing vot-
ers, were focused on content and reception (Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017; Grinberg et al., 2019; Mckay & Tenove,
2020). Instead, our findings are based on users´ percep-
tions. They show that those who see themselves as left-
ists are more aware of the problem of disinformation,
and that circumstances might make them better pro-
tected against the phenomena.
There were remarkable similarities in how users han-
dle problematic information in the three countries analy-
sed. Hasty conclusions should be avoided as they could
lead to generalizations about the phenomenon of disin-
formation in Iberoamerica; it would be worth conduct-
ing a more in-depth investigation into the differences
by country and their reasons, considering previous stud-
ies. For example, in the Venezuelan case (Serrano-Puche
et al., 2021), a different hierarchization and intensity
was found in the modalities of ‘problematic informa-
tion,’ where among other differences, poor journalism
was users’ main concern. In short, it is important to con-
tinue researching the geographic and demographic vari-
ables that best allow the identification of information
vulnerability, since the clear identification of the groups
most vulnerable to disinformation could suggest effec-
tive measures to mitigate its negative effects.
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